uttering first person sentences. How do we manage to do this? Frege's second idea is meant to solve the paradox: (b) There are two sorts of senses or modes of presentation associated with the first person. Let us call the 'special and primitive' mode of presentation which occurs in first person thoughts 'Ego' or rather 'Ego x ' where 'x' stands for the name of the person thinking the thought (for example 'Ego Lauben ' in the case of first person thoughts about Lauben). 1 This mode of presentation must be distinguished from the mode of presentation associated with the word 'I' in communication ('he who is speaking to you at this moment'). The latter can be grasped by others, the former cannot.
The paradox is solved because, according to Frege, we do not communicate the original, incommunicable first person thought involving the mode of presentation Ego x , but a different thought involving the other sort of mode of presentation.
One might think (and some have said) that the distinction between the two modes of presentation is ad hoc and designed only to solve a particular problem. I, on the contrary, think it is an essential distinction -one which lies at the very foundation of the theory of language use. In earlier writings (Recanati 1990 (Recanati , 1993 I have drawn a similar distinction on quite independent grounds. The mode of presentation 'he who is speaking to you at this moment' -technically, 'the utterer of this token' -closely corresponds to the conventional meaning of 'I' (at least if the token-reflexive analysis of indexicals is correct), yet it is clearly distinct from the mode of presentation that occurs in our first person thoughts, i.e. the special and primitive way in which every one is presented to himself. 2 This distinction between what I called 'linguistic' and 'psychological' modes of presentation is general (it affects every indexical, not merely 'I') and it holds whether or not we like Frege's solution to the paradox of the first person.
Even though it is far from ad hoc, Frege's solution is not altogether satisfactory, for it is sketchy and incomplete. What is the relation between the two sorts of mode of presentation mentioned in (b)? What makes it possible for the intersubjective sense associated with 'I' in communication to stand for the private sense Ego x which cannot be directly communicated? These are important questions which Frege does not address, let alone answer. There is another solution to the paradox, which does not rely on the distinction between the two sorts of mode of presentation but on another distinction (Dummett 1981: 122-3) . The speaker's first person thought is not, and cannot be, 'communicated' because the hearer does not, and could not, come to entertain that very thought as a result of the communication process. Still, it may be argued, the speaker's first person thought which is expressed by the utterance 'I have been wounded' can be recognized as such by the hearer. Even if the speaker's thought is unavailable to the hearer, the utterance may inform the hearer that the speaker entertains a certain type of thought, which he himself (the hearer) is unable to entertain. The speaker who says 'I have been wounded' expresses a first person thought, to the effect that he himself has been wounded. The hearer, upon understanding the utterance, can only form a different thought: 'He has been wounded'. Unlike the speaker, the hearer does not think of the referent (i.e. the speaker) in a first person way. So the speaker's thought has not been 'communicated' in the strong sense of the term. Yet it has been communicated in a weaker sense: Leo Peter knows which thought Lauben has expressed in saying 'I have been wounded'. Along these lines, it may be found unnecessary to distinguish between two sorts of thought, that which Lauben privately entertains and that which he My primary aim in this paper is to fill the gap in Frege's account so as to make it satisfactory. But I will start by considering the alternative account and raising an objection to it. To meet the objection I will suggest an improvement of the alternative account which makes it indistinguishable from Frege's. The problem of the relation between the two modes of presentation will be solved along the way.
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Even though is departs from Frege's own solution, the alternative account is Fregean in spirit. From a Fregean point of view, it has the great merit of allowing one to maintain the equation of thought and semantic content.
The semantic content of an utterance -that which the utterance expresses and which must be grasped for it to be correctly understood -is by definition an 'objective' property of that utterance which can be recognized by both speaker and hearer and which remains stable in the process of communication; but the required stability cannot be found at the level of thoughts, or so it seems. The first person thought which the speaker expresses by saying 'I have been wounded' differs from the hearer's thought formed upon understanding the utterance -they involve different modes of presentation of Lauben. The sentence means the same thing for speaker and hearer, and the statement that is made -to the effect that Lauben has been wounded -is also the same for both, but the associated thoughts change as communication proceeeds from speaker to hearer. This is what makes the Russellian notion of a (singular) 'proposition' an arguably better candidate for the status of semantic content than the Fregean notion of a thought. For the proposition ('what is said', the 'statement' that is made) remains constant from one person to the next, in contrast to the thought. As John Perry says, 'one reason we need singular propositions is to get at what we seek to preserve when we communicate with those who are in different contexts' (Perry 1988: 4) .
The alternative account disposes of this objection to Frege's equation of thought and semantic content. Even though the speaker's thought is tied to his own point of view and cannot be entertained by someone else (e.g. the hearer), still, it is this thought which is expressed by the utterance and can be recognized as such by the hearer. Its being publicly recognizable confers a sufficient objectivity on the speaker's thought, despite its essential subjectivity, to make it a plausible candidate for the status of semantic content.
Let us analyse the theoretical move at work here. Two points of view are involved in the communication process: that of the speaker and that of the hearer. In Frege's example the speaker's thought includes the mode of presentation Ego x , while the hearer's thought, formed upon understanding the utterance, is a demonstrative, third person thought: 'He has been wounded'. As long as the speaker's thought is seen as on the same footing as the hearer's, it is tied to a particular point of view and lacks the sort of objectivity needed to equate it with the utterance's semantic content. The move consists in privileging the speaker's thought and giving primacy to his point of view over the hearer's. On the 'alternative account' I have sketched (following Dummett), it is the speaker's first person thought rather than the hearer's which is objectively 'expressed' by the utterance and recognized as such by all participants in the speech episode.
One possible objection to this move is that it is somehow arbitrary. How do we choose the particular point of view to be privileged? On intuitive grounds it seems natural to select the point of view of the speaker, yet there are also reasons to select the hearer's point of view. As Evans emphasized, what matters, when we want to individuate semantic content, is what would count as a proper understanding of an utterance (Evans 1982: 92, 143n, 171, etc.) ; but 'understanding' defines the task of the hearer. Thus it is the hearer's point of view which Evans privileges. As a result of that choice he is led to deny that 'I' expresses the concept Ego x : according to him, 'I' expresses a demonstrative concept akin to that expressed by the demonstrative phrase 'that person'.
To overcome the difficulty, one may try a slightly different route. Instead of privileging a particular point of view (that of the speaker or that of the hearer), we may decide to focus on what is common to both points of view. This more or less corresponds to the Russellian strategy. According to the Russellian, what is common to the speaker's thought that he himself has been wounded and to the hearer's thought that that man, Lauben, has been wounded, is the singular proposition: <Lauben, the property of having been wounded>, that is, the state of affairs which both thoughts represent (their common 'incremental truth-conditions', in Perry's terminology [Perry 1990 ]). Now this commonalist strategy can also be opted for in a Fregean framework, for there is more that is common to both thoughts than merely the state of affairs they represent at the level of 'incremental truth-conditions'. In particular, there is more that is common to the modes of presentation under which Lauben and his addressee respectively think of Lauben than merely the reference, i.e. what these modes of presentation are modes of presentation of. (Benveniste 1956 ). They are aspects of the speech situation, and as such they are automatically (and mutually) known to both speaker and hearer qua participants in that situation. Thus both the speaker and the hearer (in a normal conversational setting) know that the speaker -say Lauben -is the speaker, that the hearer -say, Leo Peter -is the hearer, and so forth. This enables the speaker to use these mutually manifest facts in referring to the speaker, the hearer and other aspects of the speech situation. Indexicals are conventional means of doing so: the linguistic modes of presentation conventionally expressed by indexicals such as 'I' or 'you' ('the utterer', 'the addressee') correspond to facts about their referents which are created by the speech situation itself and are therefore mutually manifest to participants in the speech situation.
Since the identificatory fact appealed to by virtue of the linguistic sense of the indexical is mutually known to the speaker and his hearer, it belongs to their respective dossiers concerning the reference -the speaker's first person dossier and the hearer's third person dossier. The linguistic sense of the indexical can therefore stand for both dossiers through a cognitive process of 'synecdoche' (Recanati 1993) : the part stands for the whole. The linguistic sense of 'I' ('the utterer of this token') stands for the speaker's notion of himself because it corresponds to an aspect of that notion, to some information which the speaker's Ego-dossier contains (the information that he is the utterer of this token). Interpreting the utterance -the hearer's task -consists in going back from the part to the whole; but it is not the same whole at both ends of the communicative process. We start with the speaker's thought which involves his first person dossier. The latter does not go into the semantic content of the utterance, which contains only the linguistic sense of 'I', corresponding to an aspect or part of the original dossier. At the other end we find the hearer's thought, formed by 'interpreting' the utterance's semantic content and somehow enriching it with the hearer's own dossier concerning the speaker, which dossier also contains as a component part the identificatory fact appealed to by the indexical.
On this view Frege was right: that which is communicated -the utterance's semantic content -is not quite the speaker's original thought. It involves a mode of presentation ('the utterer of this token') which is closely related to the linguistic meaning of 'I' and differs from the special and primitive mode of presentation Ego x which occurs in the speaker's first person thought that he himself has been wounded.
